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Abstract
This paper sheds light on the main aggregate-level determinants of electoral
support for regionalist parties across 10 Western European countries. A re-
gion being relatively richer than the country to which it belongs is associated
with higher electoral support for regionalist parties only to the extent that
the region is culturally differentiated. This hypothesis is substantiated the-
oretically, tested empirically and found to hold in the form of a strong and
significant interaction effect between cultural and economic variables. This
result, omitted in previous studies, implies a profound change in the interpre-
tation of the role of income and cultural differences in explaining support for
regionalism, for both autonomist and separatist parties.
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1 Introduction
The study of the determinants of the break-up of countries and the origin of new
nation-states received considerable attention following the collapse of the Soviet
Union and Yugoslavia.1 Recently, this topic has regained momentum as two large
regions have been pushing for their independence.2 In Scotland the Scottish Na-
tional Party-led Government held a referendum on independence from the UK in
September 2014. Despite the unionist win, a sizable proportion of 44.7% of vot-
ers opted for secession (turnout: 84.59%). Likewise, Catalan authorities strove to
hold an official plebiscite on independence, but faced outright opposition from the
Spanish Government and the Constitutional Court. Given these circumstances, a
large-scale non-binding unofficial voting performance led by civil society organiza-
tions took place instead, with the collaboration of the Catalan regional Government.
In total, over 2.3 million votes were cast in November 2014 (estimated turnout was
approximately 40%), with 80.8% of participants ticking the ‘yes-yes’ option (i.e. yes,
for a state for Catalonia; yes, for an independent state)(Della Porta et al., 2017).
While these are arguably two extreme cases, support for greater regional3 autonomy
has been rising within EU member states, against a backdrop of the wider European
integration process between member states. However, electoral research tends to
overlook the relevance of the center-periphery axis on vote choice (Medeiros et al.
2015).
In line with the most recent literature, we will refer to regionalism as the process
of agitation within a sub-state territorial unit or region that leads to increasing
demands for greater autonomy, which seeks to recognize, empower, and reinforce
its structure of self-government (De Winter et al. 1998; Massetti 2009). Within
regionalist parties, we define a party as autonomist if it does not intend to secede in
any way from the current state, it respects the unity of the current state, and simply
has an ambition for a larger degree of regional self-government (Massetti and Schakel
2016: 5, 13; Jolly 2006). A party is secessionist if it promotes a territorial sub-
unit’s detachment from the nation-state of which it is currently part, and advocates
for the right to self-determination, either by becoming an independent state or by
building a new one together with other territorial units (Sorens 2005, 2008, 2012).
Consequently, we include irredentist parties as a subcategory of secessionist parties.
Hence, regionalism embeds both autonomism and secessionism, with the latter being
1Nation-states combine the state as a system of political action with national identity, the
community’s entitlement to claim for self-rule (Keating 2004).
2In the vast majority of cases, secessionism demands take the form of separatism, oriented to
supplying regions with independent state structures. There are exceptions, however, as people
in some regions would rather prefer to join another state. For instance, the German-speaking
community in the Italian South Tyrol may prefer a reattachment to Austria instead of forming a
state on their own. This phenomenon is known as irredentism, which is frequently considered a
specific sub-type of secessionism (Sorens 2005: 308, Sorens 2008: 339-340).
3A region is a ‘territorial body of public law established at the level immediately below that
of the state and endowed with political self-government’ (Assembly of European Regions 1996;
Hooghe et al. 2010). We use regions and territorial sub–units interchangeably throughout. A
nation is defined as a community of people with a set of coordinated beliefs about their cultural
identities that claim self-government, with varying degrees of intensity (Moreno 1995: 237; Laitin
2007: 40- 41).
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a more radical form of regionalism and the former a milder form.
Despite the rise of regionalist parties and movements in the last decades (in France,
Spain, Italy and the UK, amongst others), there have been surprisingly few empirical
studies on the determinants of their support. Even though there are some notable
exceptions to this trend (eg., Sorens, 2005, 2008, 2012; Massetti and Schakel, 2016;
Brancati, 2014), we consider that two crucial issues warrant further study, as there
is no consensus about them in existing literature. Firstly, what is the relation
between cultural and economic factors in explaining the electoral success of different
regionalist forces? Secondly, what is the connection between the two main forms of
regionalism, i.e. autonomism and secessionism? Are they two different versions of
the same phenomenon or two distinct phenomena?
We argue that cultural proximity accounts for the support for increasing regional au-
tonomy through an interaction between cultural and income-related variables which
has not been explored in the existing literature. The main finding is that a region
being richer relative to the rest of the country is only correlated with support for
more regional autonomy if its culture is significantly different from the main one in
the country, and not otherwise. Similarly, the cultural–identity gap is significantly
more important in accounting for the success of regionalist and secessionist parties
in relatively rich regions, playing a much smaller role in poorer ones. This common
feature underpins both autonomist and secessionist electoral support. Finally, the
paper develops the idea that —at least in electoral studies —these two forms of
regionalism are intimately intertwined, both on theoretical and empirical grounds.
The paper is structured as follows. The next section reviews the relevant contribu-
tions in the literature. The third section develops our theoretical framework. The
data, empirical model and main results from the empirical enquiry are described in
the fourth section. The fifth section concludes by highlighting the main implications
of this paper.
2 Literature review
The main factors identified in the literature as accounting for regionalist support—
either in its autonomist or secessionist versions–– can be divided in two broad cat-
egories: cultural and economic (Brancati, 2014; Hooghe et al., 2010; Jolly, 2006;
Massetti and Schakel, 2016; Sorens, 2005, 2008, 2012).
Cultural explanations of support for greater regional autonomy emphasize the role
of historical, traditional, linguistic and ethnic factors. These are often associated
with some distinctive identity features, such as having a specific minority language
(Van Houten, 2000; Fearon and Van Houten, 2002).4 For example, cultural expla-
nations help to explain the support for secessionism in Catalonia and the Basque
4National identity is the sense of a nation as a cohesive whole. It refers to the set of tendencies
and values derived from the feeling of belonging to a united group of people with distinctive
traditions, history and culture. National identity is neither fixed nor alterable at will. It requires
a periodical redefinition in the light of historical features, present needs and future aspirations
Parekh 1995 remarks.
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Country. These two regions have a strong tradition of identity nationalism linked to
their language, and in both regions secessionist parties gathered approximately 60%
of the votes in the last regional elections.5 However, Catalan is also spoken in the
regions of Valencia and the Balearic Islands, which are both autonomous commu-
nities that have traditionally shown active hostility to secessionism, although there
has been some, rather mild, support for autonomism (Riera, 2014).6 Similarly, while
Scottish separatism has been on the rise in the last decades, Scottish Gaelic is barely
spoken by 1% of Scots. This contrasts with the situation in Wales, where around
20% of the population speaks Welsh, but support for secessionism is much lower.
Having a distinctive minority language might not be the only (or even the main)
sign of cultural difference. Other cultural or identity aspects might play a role in
determining support for greater regional autonomy. In fact, Desmet et al. 2011
show that physical distance between the capitals of two countries is a better proxy
for cultural difference than the linguistic distance between their main languages.
Yet, cultural factors alone cannot explain support for greater regional autonomy.
We argue that cases of culturally differentiated, but relatively poor, regions, such
as Galicia in Spain, Sicily in Italy or the French overseas departments, where the
support for regionalism is relatively low or non-existent, show that cultural-identity
factors alone cannot explain a large support for autonomist or secessionist parties.
It is well known that economic variables such as income, wealth and relative eco-
nomic well-being may also influence secessionist and autonomist support. Appeals
to primordial past, history and traditions of a nation seem to affect voting to a
much lesser extent than material concerns and socio-economic issues, at least when
it comes to endorsing secessionist parties (Sorens, 2005). Accordingly, debates on
territorial separation (and also current prosecessionist referendum campaigns, such
as the recent Scottish and Catalan ones) have often focused on the economic effi-
ciency losses and gains of separation vis-à-vis the status quo.7 From an individual
level of analysis, political economists have addressed this issue as well. The estab-
lished literature on the break-up of nation-states, for instance, offers a trade-off that
determines whether or not secession is optimal for a given individual (e.g., Alesina
and Spolaore, 1997). While integration facilitates coordination and minimizes the
duplication of fixed costs in the provision of public goods (e.g., in defence and law
enforcement), the main incentive for independence is that the benefits from remain-
ing united are generally not evenly distributed among all citizens (nor regions) at the
country level. For instance, heterogeneity in tax contributions across regions, result-
ing from differences in average income per capita, accentuate economic grievances
(Bolton and Roland, 1997). The latter are at the core of claims for greater auton-
omy and secession: the argument is that the centre’s economic policies are holding
the growth of the region down or that the (richer) region is subsidizing poorer ones
(Horowitz, 1981). The Italian Lega Nord political party often puts these arguments
forward, for example. There seems to be a widespread agreement in the literature
5Considering the following parties as secessionists: CiU, ERC, ICV, CUP and SI in Catalonia;
and PNV and Bildu in the Basque Country (Nordsieck, 2015) (see table 7 in appendix 6.2).
6The Basque language is also spoken in Navarre, where there is indeed a relatively high support
for both autonomist and secessionist parties.
7Muñoz and Tormos 2015 emphasize the importance of economic aspirations and partisanship
in their inquiry on individual-level determinants for secessionism in Catalonia.
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that richer regions tend to be more prone to back autonomist (De Winter et al.,
1998; Van Houten, 2000; Gordin, 2001) and secessionist parties (Sorens, 2005).
Some existing contributions have already considered the interrelated effect of both
cultural and economic variables to explain secessionist support. For example, in
their study on the trade-offs between the benefits of large jurisdictions and the
costs of heterogeneity of large and diverse populations, Alesina and Spolaore 1997
present a model that implies that democratization leads to secessions, there is an
inefficiently high number of countries in equilibrium, and the equilibrium number
of countries increases in the amount of economic integration. In his study of ethnic
conflict in Eurasia, Hale 2008 finds an association between ethnic distinctiveness
and separatism that he contends is because ethnicity accentuates difficulties of union
governments at portraying themselves as non-exploiters of minority groups on the
benefit of the dominant group. Focusing on Yugoslavia, Desmet et al. 2011 find that
agents’ preferences over different geographical configurations (i.e. the likelihood
of secessions and unions) is determined by trade-off between the costs of greater
cultural heterogeneity and increasing returns in the provision of public goods.
Whilst these contributions are enlightening and advance theories to an, arguably
limited, extent consistent with our main argument (i.e., economy and culture interact
to promote greater support for autonomism and secessionism), this is, to the best of
our knowledge, the first empirical paper with aggregated panel data that focuses on
unravelling the crucial interaction effect between cultural and economic variables in
explaining the support for autonomist and secessionist parties. This points not only
towards an inadequacy of additive models to test for the determinants of regionalist
support, but also a potential lack of theorization on the interplay between economic
and cultural arguments as explanatory factors.
Another important question refers to the connection between autonomism and se-
cessionism. It is widely accepted that these two processes are interrelated in con-
ceptual and empirical terms (e.g. Jolly, 2006). They share many crucial aspects, as
both reject and react against the status quo in favour of some alternative involving
more self-government. However, some studies have stressed their diverging features
(Sorens, 2008). From this point of view, autonomism and separatism would be differ-
ent processes, driven by different dynamics and factors. Existing empirical evidence
suggests that cultural variables are most important in determining autonomist sup-
port (Gordin, 2001; Fearon and Van Houten, 2002), whereas economic variables are
most important in determining secessionist support (Sorens, 2005; Brancati, 2014).
We argue that both cultural and economic factors and, most importantly, their in-
teraction drive the electoral support for both autonomist and secessionist parties in
the same direction. This, together with other empirical findings, suggests that, at
least in electoral studies, autonomism and secessionism should be considered as two
varieties of the same process, namely regionalism.
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3 Theoretical framework
3.1 Cultural proximity, relative income, and electoral sup-
port for regionalism
Cultural proximity influences the feeling of belonging to a large social group and
determines whom people in a given region region care about. This has an important
role in the political participation process. When choosing whether or not to sup-
port greater regional autonomy, people whose region’s culture is distinct from the
majority of the nation will care more about the implications of that decision for the
population in that same territorial subunit. On the other extreme, in regions whose
culture mainly coincides with the main one in the country, people will tend to care
relatively more about the effects that a certain political choice would have for the
overall population in the country as a whole. In this context, this gap between the
regional and the majoritarian culture in the country is known as cultural distance.
This effect of culture on electoral support for regional autonomy has important im-
plications, as it introduces an important interaction between economic and cultural
factors. With people in more differentiated regions caring mainly about the well-
being of those in their same region, support for regionalism among the population
will be large if this is thought to improve the situation of the full group, provided
that the region is rich. Alternatively, the population in a relatively rich region will
support regionalism to a large degree only when the region’s culture is significantly
different from the predominant one in the country. Those in highly differentiated
but poor regions will tend to see the less decentralized status quo as better for their
region’s material interests, and we would expect a relatively low proportion of the
electorate to support increasing regionalism. This analysis brings us to the main
hypothesis of the paper:
Hypothesis 1: There exists a positive interaction effect between cultural and eco-
nomic factors on the support for increasing regional autonomy.
This interaction between economic and cultural aspects underpinning the vote for
regionalist parties has been overlooked in the literature to date, as existing aggregate
studies are based on additive models. This interaction has important implications,
both to explain the support for regionalist parties and to contribute to a better
understanding of the determinants of the relationship between the electoral support
for secessionist and for autonomist options.
3.2 Cultural proximity, autonomism and secessionism
The interrelationship between secessionism and autonomism warrants further anal-
ysis. From a theoretical point of view, we approach this puzzle using a simple model
that builds on Sorens 2004 contribution. Voters are located on a continuum ranging
from 0 to 6, with 0 representing maximum unionism and 6 representing indepen-
dence. We assume that the election is regional (and not a referendum), and we care
about any voter i, not necessarily the median voter. Let us assume, for simplicity,
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that there are only two parties in the election, a centralist one and a regionalist one,
with proposed policies respectively being Pc and Pr. Voter i preferences are given
by the negative loss function:
U(Pj, Ii) = −a(|Pj − Ii|)2, (1)
where a is a positive constant, U(Pj, Ii) is the utility of voter i under policy Pj and
Ii is the ideal policy point of voter i. In our example, the policy offered by the
centralist party is Pc = 1, and voter i preferred policy point Ii= 4. If the regionalist
party is either an autonomist party with Pr = 3, or a secessionist party with Pr = 6,
voter i will choose to vote for the regionalist party (one of the two existing in this
region). This is consistent with the fact that not necessarily all the people who
vote for secessionist parties in a regional election want their region to break away
from their current nation-state. Similarly, in regions without secessionist parties,
a part of the electorate of autonomists parties might want the region to secede.
This misalignment between the preferred level of regional autonomy and voting
behaviour derives from the existence of a discrete number of parties, and raises
the following question: should the determinants of autonomism and secessionism
through electoral results be studied as two different processes or as two aspects of
the same phenomena?
We argue that analyzing electoral support for these two options as different processes
might lead to misleading conclusions. If secessionist parties are included in the group
of ‘non-autonomist parties’ when empirically analyzing the determinants of electoral
support for autonomist parties, the results might be biased (see Figure 2 in appendix
6.3 in the supplemental data online). As a given predictor might have an effect not
only on autonomism but also on the support for secessionist parties, considering
only autonomist parties as an independent category biases the estimated effect of
this variable downwards. Alternatively, if support for autonomist parties is put
together with non-regionalists when studying support for secessionist parties, the
estimate will be biased.
In order to test this, we split the full sample into two separate ones. The first of
these keeps only those regions and periods that have only votes for secessionist and
nonregionalist parties, or for non-regionalist parties alone. The second contains those
observations in which there is a positive proportion of votes either for autonomist
and non-regionalist parties, or for just non-regionalist parties. The observations for
those regions that have a positive amount of votes for the two different categories
of regionalist parties are excluded in both samples, i.e., regions with support for
autonomist parties are excluded from the first sample and observations with support
for secessionist parties are dropped in the second one. Given that we argue the same
mechanism underlies electoral support for autonomist and secessionist parties, we
would expect the following hypotheses to hold:
Hypothesis 2a: For the models explaining electoral support for either autonomist
or secessionist parties, the coefficients for the same variables across models (with
full and the separated samples) should show statistically different results.
Hypothesis 2b: When only the separated samples are considered, coefficients ex-
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plaining support for autonomism and secessionism should not differ in statistical
terms.
If hypotheses 2a/2b are satisfied, placing secessionism and autonomism in the same
continuum measuring different degrees of regionalism will be justified, with maximal
unionism and secessionism located at the extremes, and autonomism in between.
As both increasing regional autonomy and secessionism imply steering policies to
be more regional specific, we would expect the effect of the interaction between
economic and cultural variables to go in the same direction —albeit not necessarily
with the same intensity —for the two forms of regionalism. This gives the third
hypothesis of the paper:
Hypothesis 3: The interaction effect between cultural and economic variables
is positive in models explaining the electoral support for both autonomism and
secessionism separately.
Confirming this hypothesis (with the separated samples) is consistent with the view
of secessionism and autonomism as two forms of minority nationalism.
4 Empirics
4.1 Data
We built a cross-sectional data set using data from regions of Portugal, Spain,
France, the UK, Italy, Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, Denmark and Aus-
tria (NUTS-1 regions for Germany, Belgium, Denmark and the UK; NUTS-2 for the
other cases; see table 6, in appendix 6.2).
We then merged it with the 1969–2000 data set from Sorens 2005, updating this with
the most recent elections—till 2014—, and adding some explanatory variables and
regions.8 Our analysis was restricted to West European countries for two reasons.
Firstly, they all have established and comparable regional elections. Secondly, while
cultural differences are highly correlated with geographical distances across Western
Europe (Desmet et al., 2011), this is arguably not the case in countries that were
settlement colonies in the past. By reducing the sample to Western Europe, we can
confidently use geographical distance as a proxy for cultural differences.
The dependent variables are respectively given by the percentage of votes for au-
tonomist (v_auton), secessionist (v_sec), and the sum of both types of parties
(v_reg) in a given regional election.9 As the centre–periphery territorial cleavage
8We exclude Dutch, British and French overseas countries and territories (and also the Channels
Islands and Isle of Man). The same holds for Greenland (Denmark), given its quasi-independent
status. In turn, we include outermost regions (Azores, Madeira, Canary Islands, French overseas
departments). We also consider the following ‘special cases’: Ceuta and Melilla (Spain), Gibraltar
(UK) and Faroe Islands (Denmark).
9Our data for the percentage of votes casted for a party come both from Nordsieck 2015 Parties
and Elections database and official regional or state-level resources. When more than one party
fits in the secessionist or autonomist category, we aggregate their percentages. To be included, the
party must have gained either seats in the regional chamber or more than 1% of votes.
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tends to be channelled through the institutional domain in well-established democra-
cies, these are used as proxies for general support for each of these political options.
To determine under which category a given party falls, we use different secondary
and primary sources (manifestos, party websites and various academic contribu-
tions). Our party classification fits Nordsieck 2015 recent categorization for that
respective election (see 7, appendix 6.2).10 For instance, the autonomist Partido
Regionalista de Cantabria is in favour of greater regional autonomy for Cantabria
but not independence from Spain, whereas the Scottish SNP is characterized as se-
cessionist because it campaigns on a platform seeking independence from the UK.11
Our two main groups of explanatory factors, cultural proximity and economic as-
pects, are operationalized through different predictors, as follows.
Cultural variables
• Language is the proportion of residents in the region who speak a language
other than the predominant one in the country. Having a regional vernacular
language strengthens the regional cultural identity.12 Aiming at protecting it,
citizens may be keener to vote for regionalist parties (data sources: Lewis and
Gary 2013; Sorens 2005).13
• Distance is the straight-line physical distance between the capitals of the re-
gion and the country, measured in hundreds of kilometres. In Western Europe,
physical distance has historically been an obstacle to ensuring political coor-
dination, cultural homogenization and reinforcing a sense of belonging. As
Desmet et al. 2011 show using World Value Survey (WVS) data, the correla-
tion between cultural distance and geographic distance is high (0.52) between
West European countries.14 As a proxy for cultural distance, we expect dis-
tance to be positively correlated with a region’s desire for greater regionalism
—and the effect should be larger for relatively rich regions.
A concern is whether distance might affect v_reg significantly through alternative
channels, other than cultural. As abovementioned, using geographical distance as a
proxy for cultural distance would be problematic for the whole world, particularly
for former settlement colonies (e.g., United States, Canada, Australia). We test for
10Following Massetti and Schakel 2016 criteria, in electoral coalitions where regionalist parties
are involved, seat allocation is used to assign vote shares to the coalition partners.
11In some cases, it can be challenging to classify political parties. For example, it is not clear
to which extent the Bavarian CSU, Northern Irish UUP and Navarra’s UPN act separately from
statewide parties (Massetti and Schakel, 2016). We rely on Nordsieck 2015 and Sorens 2005
criteria, and considered the party as regionalist or not depending on the election. Excluding these
problematic cases does not change our findings.
12This refers to long-term established regional languages, excluding recent linguistic minorities
(e.g., first generations of migrants).
13Estimating the proportion of speakers and defining the linguistic status (i.e. whether it is a
dialect or a language) is often problematic. Although language is time-invariant, it should be a
good proxy for cultural heterogeneity.
14The correlation holds if the analysis by Desmet et al. 2011 is restricted to the countries in our
sample (0.44). It is always higher than the correlation between linguistic and cultural distance:
0.42 in their sample, 0.33 for ours.
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the effect of distance on v_reg in these three large former colonies. The coefficient
for this variable and the interaction distance_GDP (where GDP refers to gross
domestic product ratio) are not significant in any of the regressions, pointing towards
alternative channels through which geographic distance could affect electoral support
for regionalist parties not being particularly relevant.15 As an alternative test, we
run a two-stage least squares (2SLS) model to explain v_reg, instrumenting distance
and its interaction distance_GDP with language and its interaction language_GDP.
Both variables are positive and statistically significant (see table 11, appendix 6.2).16
4.1.1 Economic variables
• GDP_ratio measures the relative difference in the average income between
the region and the whole country (regional GDPpc/ national GDPpc). We
centre this variable around 1, such that it takes the value 0 when the GDP per
capita of the region and that of the country are equal, and positive (negative)
if the GDP per capita of the region is larger (smaller) than that of the nation
as a whole.17 We expect a positive effect for this variable through its inter-
action with cultural distance (with positive coefficients for the interactions
distance_GDP and language_GDP): richer regions will support greater au-
tonomy and secession to avoid redistribution to poorer regions when cultural
distance is larger.
• Richer_neighbor is a dummy that captures whether the region has a border
with another country that is richer than the country to which it belongs, as
this is associated with positive economic expectations toward independence or
greater autonomy.
We also include different control variables in our models, as follows.
Main controls:
• As support for greater regional autonomy might have increased over time, year
captures the year when the election took place.
• Has_neighbor is a dummy (taking the value 1 if the region has a border with
another country and 0 otherwise) to isolate the effect of richer_neighbor from
the general effect of having a neighbor.
• Population: The number of the region’s inhabitants, in hundreds of thousands.
The impact of having a larger population on the desire for greater autonomy
and secession is ambiguous. More populated regions tend to have more weight
on countrywide political decisions, which should decrease the support for in-
15We run a pooled ordinary least squares (OLS) regression with Sorens 2005 panel sub-sample
for these three countries (N=1,000). As expected, while distance and the other related variables
are never significant, language is still significant.
16The hypothesis of weak instrument is rejected (in model 4, F -test for excluded instruments is
F(2,120)=6.23, p=0.0027, for distance, and 4.08, p=0.0194, for distance_GDP ).
17Given that no observation in our sample gets close to a 0 value for GDP_ratio, centering this
variable around 1 is more appropriate (the lowest value in our sample is 0.4; observations below
0.6 are rare).
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Variable N Mean Std. Deviation Min Max
GDP_ratio 1232 -0.041 0.222 -0.597 1.197
distance 1309 3.240 5.159 0 93.755
language 1309 0.142 0.241 0 1
distance_GDP 1232 -0.279 2.263 -40.144 15.739
language_GDP 1232 -0.009 0.082 -0.408 0.443
year 1309 1990.937 9.243 1969 2014
has_neighbor 1309 0.503 0.500 0 1
neighbor_richer 1309 0.254 0.435 0 1
population 1269 25.555 39.533 0.298 492.71
regional_elect 1309 0.415 0.493 0 1
chamber_size 1179 67.256 39.489 2 237
ENERP* 1073 3.673 1.400 0.529 10.721
hist_together* 1173 0.559 0.490 0 1
region_auton* 1309 2.183 1.239 0 4
irredentist_potential* 1309 0.112 0.315 0 1
party_elsewhere* 1309 0.133 0.339 0 1
Table 1 – Descriptive statistics. The variables with * are only used in robustness
checks.
creasing regional autonomy. However, large populated regions are more viable
as independent states, which should increase the support for secessionism.
• Chamber_size measures the number of seats in the regional parliament, and
is positively associated with multipartism.
• Regional_elect is a dummy that distinguishes the nature of the election in
Sorens 2005 data (1= regional; 0= national election). We expect voters to
support regional parties more strongly in regional elections.
• Country FEs (fixed effects) are country dummies that capture specific (in-
stitutional, historical, cultural) characteristics of each country that might be
correlated with support for regional parties.
Besides these variables (see table 1 for descriptive statistics; for the correlation be-
tween the main predictors, see table 8, appendix 6.2), additional controls are used for
robustness checks. We control for the level of regional autonomy (regional_auton),
irredentist potential (irredentist_potential), whether the region is part of a EU mem-
ber state (EU ), it has past historical records of independence (hist_together ; indep)
and is the capital of the country (Capital), religious differences (religion), squared
physical distance (distance_sq), the degree of multipartism (ENERP ), and if some
of its regional parties also contest elections in other regions (party_elsewhere) —for
a description of these variables, see appendix 6.1.
Although all these variables have been tested, some are excluded from the reported
models for various reasons, such as having important endogeneity problems (e.g.
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the degree of autonomy already obtained by the region and ENERP ) or not being
significant in several of the specifications. The latter includes some variables de-
scribed above, such as distance_sq, EU, religion, indep, and capital, as well as other
minor controls such as the legal status of the language (whether or not it is official),
whether or not the region is in the mainland, population density and ideological gap,
measured as the absolute difference in votes for left-wing parties in the territorial
subunits for their respective last regional and general elections.
4.2 The empirical model
The estimation methodology used is a pooled ordinary lest squares (OLS) regression
with country fixed effects and errors clustered at the regional level.18 This equation
gives the main model specification:
V otesjkt = αk + βGDP_ratiojt + δdistancej + ρlanguagej+
λ(distance×GDP_ratio)jt + γ(GDP_ratio× language)jt +
H∑
j=1
θhXjt + jt. (2)
The percentage of votes for regionalist parties in region j, country k and period
t, is modelled as a function of GDP_ratio, distance, language, the interactions
distance_GDP , language_GDP , and other controls X. As some model specifica-
tions include country dummies, there is a potential dependence of constant α
k on the country k, i.e.,
αk = α +
K−1∑
k=1
ωk11∈k
where 11∈k = 1 if region i belongs to country k and 0 otherwise.
Although v_reg is the main dependent variable, electoral support for the two sub-
types of regionalist parties, autonomists (v_auton) and secessionists (v_sec) are
also used as dependent variables in some model specifications.
The main hypotheses from the theoretical framework are tested empirically in the
following manner:
• Hypothesis 1: we expect that (at least one of) the coefficients for distance_GDP
and language_GDP will be positive and significant. Formally:
Ho = λ > 0, γ > 0. (3)
18The earliest election in our data set is in 1969, the last in 2014. Data in this full interval
of time are not available for all regions and elections. Even though historical and institutional
differences between the countries might be important, given that the effect of country-level factors
on the support for regionalism is not the focus of our study, we include country fixed effects.
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• Hypothesis 2a: a Wald test comparing the coefficients of the models for v_sec
using the full and separated samples should report statistical differences. The
same holds for v_auton.
• Hypothesis 2b: In the models for v_auton and v_sec using separated samples,
the main coefficients should not be statistically different.
• Hypothesis 3: hypothesis 1 should hold also when explaining support for au-
tonomist and secessionist parties separately. As we argue using the full sample
would yield biased coefficients, we use the separated samples. At least either
λ or γ should be significant in the corresponding regressions.
4.3 Results
Table 2, with the pooled OLS analysis of the determinants of v_reg (large sample,
errors clustered by region) gives the main results of the paper. The richest specifi-
cation, including country fixed effects, is our preferred model (Column 4). Overall,
the solid empirical evidence provided —supported by numerous robustness checks
—confirms our four hypotheses. We analyze our results for each hypothesis next.
Hypothesis 1
The interaction terms distance_GDP and language_GDP have a positive effect
on v_reg at the 1% level (table 2). When the interactions are introduced into the
model, the GDP_ratio is no longer significant. This means that relative regional
per capita income accounts for regional party support through its interaction with
cultural variables, and not by itself. Without the interaction terms, this coefficient
is significant (columns 1 and 3, table 2) because of omitted variables bias. This
interaction, which has been overlooked to date in empirical studies, is crucial for
interpreting the main factors behind the support for regionalist parties.
To illustrate this, we analyze the marginal effects of this interaction in our preferred
model (column 4, table 2). If a region is 100 km farther away from the capital
of the country than another region, ceterisparibus, the expected difference in the
percentage of votes cast for regionalist parties depends on GDP_ratio as given by:
dv_reg
ddistance
= 1.53 + 2.18GDP_ratio. (4)
Similarly, conditional upon the value of GDP_ratio, the effect of a marginal change
in the proportion of speakers of a regional distinctive language on v_reg is given
by:
dv_reg
dlanguage
= 20.44 + 43.66GDP_ratio. (5)
Table 3 top shows the marginal effects of distance for different values of GDP_ratio.
From the first row, we can see that a region located 600 km away from the capital
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
v_reg v_reg v_reg v_reg
GDP_ratio 19.82∗∗∗ 0.291 13.90∗∗∗ -3.288
(6.044) (5.181) (4.093) (4.630)
distance 0.767∗∗∗ 1.695∗∗∗ 0.683∗∗∗ 1.528∗∗∗
(0.252) (0.320) (0.215) (0.305)
language 23.09∗∗∗ 28.16∗∗∗ 17.03∗∗∗ 20.44∗∗∗
(7.464) (5.950) (6.181) (5.915)
distance_GDP 2.636∗∗∗ 2.184∗∗∗
(0.736) (0.676)
language_GDP 52.71∗∗∗ 43.66∗∗∗
(17.46) (15.51)
year 0.152∗∗∗ 0.158∗∗∗
(0.0412) (0.0387)
has_neighbor -2.763 -4.894∗
(2.932) (2.691)
richer_neighbor 12.63∗∗∗ 11.54∗∗∗
(3.339) (3.235)
population -0.162∗∗∗ -0.165∗∗∗
(0.0582) (0.0511)
chamber_size 0.0849∗ 0.113∗∗∗
(0.0493) (0.0419)
regional_elect 2.681∗∗∗ 2.453∗∗∗
(0.677) (0.697)
Country FEs No No Yes Yes
Observations 1232 1232 1102 1102
R2 0.317 0.420 0.531 0.587
Adjusted R2 0.316 0.417 0.523 0.579
Table 2 – Pooled ordinary least squares (OLS) model explaining votes for regional-
ist (autonomist + seccesionist) parties using the full sample. The constant term is
excluded from the table for paucity reasons. Errors clustered at the regional level.
Standard errors are given in parentheses. *p<0.10, **<0.05, ***p<0.01.
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is, ceterisparibus, more likely to show a greater support for regional parties than
one which is 500 km away. However, this effect is conditional on the relative eco-
nomic aﬄuence of the region. If the two hypothetical regions we are comparing are
relatively poor, with the GDP per capita in the region being only half of that of
the country (GDP_ratio= –0.5), being 100 km farther away implies an increase of
0.44% in votes casted for regionalist parties. If these two regions were very rich,
with the GDP per capita of both regions being 80% larger than the national GDP
per capita (GDP_ratio=0.8), being 100 kilometers farther away would imply a
3.28% increase in regionalist support. Similarly, if a region’s per capita GDP equals
the national average (GDP_ratio= 0), there will be a 20.44% increase in votes for
regionalist parties if everybody speaks a vernacular language relative to not hav-
ing a regional language. If these two same regions are very rich in relative terms
(GDP_ratio= 0.8), regionalist electoral support will increase by 55.37%. However,
if these regions are very poor (GDP_ratio = -0.5), the marginal effect of language
on v_reg becomes negative. Hence, the model predicts that very poor and cultur-
ally differentiated regions will tend to be more centralist than equally poor regions
which are more culturally similar to the rest of the country.19
The implications of the interaction term for the marginal effect of differences in GDP
per capita between the region and the country are— even more— critical. Since the
coefficient for GDP_ratio is not significant for any of our models with interactions,
the marginal effect of a one-unit change in GDP_ratio on v_reg, is fully dependent
on the value taken by the cultural variables, being 0 for a region whose culture is
identified as the main culture in the country.20 Formally:
dv_reg
dGDP_ratio = 2.18distance+ 43.66language. (6)
3-bottom shows how the effect of GDP_ratio on regionalist vote depends on the
distance at which the given region is from the capital of the country, and the propor-
tion of speakers of a regional distinctive language. In two regions with no vernacular
language, which are 100 km away from the capital and whose GDP_ratio differs
by one unit, the predicted difference of regionalist support is only 2.18%. This
difference becomes much higher (43.68%) for a 2000 km distance. The effect of
the interaction with language is also very large: for two regions that have 25% of
speakers of a vernacular language, the difference in expected support for regionalist
parties would be 13.09% (if located at 100 km from the capital) and 54.59% (at
2000 km from the capital). With a 100% of vernacular language speakers in these
regions, differences would become 45.84% and 87.34%, respectively.21
To sum up, from these analyses, we conclude that the following:
19Beyond the scope of this paper, this finding presents an interesting avenue for inquiry for the
social psychological literature on national identity (e.g. Bloom, 1993; Spinner-Halev and Theiss-
Morse, 2003).
20We explored the implications of the region having the capital of the country in an unreported
regression with a dummy. Its coefficient is not statistically significant once geographical distance
is controlled for, and does not alter the results.
21This is an extreme case, but in fact more than 90% of the population speaks a vernacular
language in some sub-units, such as the German-Speaking Communities in Belgium or the Faroe
Islands in Denmark.
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GDP_ratio -0.5 0 0.5 0.8
∂ v_reg
∂ distance
0.44 1.53 2.62 3.28
∂ v_reg
∂ language
-1.39 20.44 42.27 55.37
language
∂ v_reg
∂ GDP_ratio 0 0.25 0.5 1
0 0 10.91 21.83 43.66
100 2.18 13.09 24.01 45.84
km 500 10.92 21.83 32.75 54.58
1000 21.84 32.75 43.67 65.50
2000 43.68 54.59 65.51 87.34
Table 3 – Top: Marginal effect of increasing distance by 100 km and language from
0 to 1 on support for regionalist parties for different values of GDP_ratio. Bottom:
Marginal effect of GDP_ratio on support for regionalist parties for different values
of distance and language.
1. The degree to which cultural differences between a region and the majoritarian
culture in its country affect the support for regionalism in Western Europe is
significantly influenced by relative regional aﬄuence. Being more culturally
differentiated is associated with a large gain in support for regionalism in
relatively rich regions, but with a much smaller one for relatively poor ones.
2. Being relatively richer only increases support for regionalism in regions whose
culture is significantly different from the predominant one in the country.
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Figure 1 – LHS: Predicted vote for regional parties (v_reg) as a function of
GDP_ratio for given values of distance (in 100 km). RHS: Predicted vote for re-
gional parties (v_reg) as a function of GDP_ratio for given values of language (in
proportion 0-1). The other variables are evaluated at their average values.
Figure 1 illustrates the relevance of the interaction term for the model predictions.
An increase in GDP_ratio translates into different predictions of votes for region-
alist parties depending on the distance at which the corresponding region is from
the capital of the country. While regionalist parties in a relatively rich region with
a GDP_ratio of 0.8 and located 500 km away from the capital of the country are
expected to obtain around 20% of the votes, this share is almost 60% in a region
located at 2000 km from the capital, keeping the other variables at their means.
Equivalently, the effect of differences in distance on the share of votes for regionalist
parties is much smaller for poor regions. When we compare two equivalent regions
with a GDP_ratio of -0.5 but at 500 and 2000 km from the capital, we see that
the difference in the percentage of predicted votes is less than 10%. For the same
difference in distance, the predicted share of votes for regionalist parties in two rich
regions with a GDP_ratio of 0.8 differs by almost 40%.
Similarly, for a relatively rich region (GDP_ratio= 0.8), voting intention for region-
alist parties fluctuates between 15%, 25% and 47%, as the percentage of speakers of
the regional distinctive language changes from 25%, to 50% and 100%, ceterisparibus.
In a relatively poor region (GDP_ratio= -0.5), the predicted support for regional-
ists is almost 0. In this case, having different proportions of speakers of a minority
language does not affect regionalist voting.
We conducted several tests to check whether our findings are robust to different
methodologies and specifications. Including only one of the two cultural variables
and its interaction with GDP_ratio is enough to cancel out the latter’s effect and
obtain a positive and significant interaction (table 9, appendix 6.2). Results hold
if we use only the last regional election for every case (N= 120; table 10, appendix
6.2), and if we run tobit models (table 12, appendix 6.2) which are left- and right-
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censored at 0 and 100 respectively to reflect the fact that the dependent variable,
by definition, can never fall outside these bounds. The interaction between cultural
and economic factors is also robust to instrument distance and distance_GDP with
language and language_GDP in a 2SLS regression.22 This model should capture
the exogenous effect of cultural distance and its interaction with GDP_ratio (table
11, appendix 6.2). Finally, the interactions are also robust to running a model with
frequency weights, in which each region gets a weight proportional to its population
(table 13, appendix 6.2).
Returning to the main model (regression 4, table 2), our controls report some sig-
nificant effects. A 1 million increase in a region’s population is associated with a
decrease of a 1.65% in the expected percentage of votes for regionalist parties. This
result is very robust across different specifications,23 and also for the models with
either v_sec or v_auton as dependent variables— with the separated sample.24
Thus, having a larger weight on nationwide politics seems to ease regionalist aspira-
tions. Coefficients associated to the variables year, regional_elect, chamber_size,
and richer_neighbor are positive, as expected, while having a neighboring country
which is poorer than the current one (has_neighbor=1 and richer_neighbor=0)
decreases regionalist support— at the 10% level of significance. Including country
fixed effects improves the explanatory capacity of the model, and does not have
much impact on the size of coefficients.
Hypotheses 2
We proceed next to analyze whether v_sec and v_reg should be kept aggregated
in v_reg or should be better analyzed independently. We run a Wald test to test
whether each coefficient is equal across the two models being compared. Table 4
reports the number of statistically different coefficients in each model comparison.25
The third row shows that the Wald test rejects the hypothesis of equal coefficients for
three variables: there are three coefficients which are different between the model
explaining v_auton using the full sample, i.e. including those regions with some
v_sec, and the model explaining v_auton using the separated sample, only with
regions without secessionist votes. When v_sec becomes the dependent variable two
statistically different coefficients are reported for the same models with different
22In this specification, the coefficient for distance_GDP is larger than in the main model. The
effect of GDP_ratio on v_reg becoming negative and significant for the 2SLS regression means
that the population in not-culturally differentiated regions which are richer would vote less for
regionalist parties than the population in poorer ones, taking the main thesis of the paper to the
extreme.
23The negative significant coefficient for population holds also in non-reported robustness checks,
such as including the contry’s population, or the relative population of the region over the popu-
lation of the country as regressors, or taking the log of the variable instead of the level.
24Population loses its significance and changes its sign only in the regressions with the full sample
and v_sec as the dependent variable (table 15, appendix 6.2). Note we contend throughout that
these models are biased.
25The explanatory variables included in each of these models are the same as those included in
the main model (Column 4, table 2). The models in the table are respectively: v_sec sep (Column
2, 5); v_auton sep (Column 4, table 5); v_sec full (Column 2, table 15, appendix 6.2); and
v_auton full (Column 4, table 15, appendix 6.2).
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Models compared # Diff. Different coefficients
v_auton sep - v_sec sep 0 -
v_sec full - v_auton full 0 -
v_auton full - v_auton sep 3 year, language_GDP, language.
v_sec full - v_sec sep 2 richer_neighbor, population.
Table 4 – The number of different coefficients between the models. Wald test, 10%
level of significance. Full stands for the full sample, sep for the separated sample,
which excludes the regions with a positive amount of the other type of regionalist vote.
samples (row 4). Hence, hypothesis 2a holds: for the models using v_sec and
v_auton as the dependent variables, the regression coefficients corresponding to the
same variables across two different samples show statistically significant different
results.
While the evidence provided so far is coherent with the argumentation for the coeffi-
cients in one of the models to be biased, it does not indicate which of the two options
—full or separated sample —is better. Two pieces of evidence offer some guidance in
this choice. The first —arguably limited—argument concerns explanatory capacity.
The two models with the separated samples have a higher explanatory capacity than
with the full samples (R2 is 0.52 vs 0.35 for v_sec— columns 2, table 5 and table
15, appendix 6.2— and 0.62 vs 0.45 for v_auton— columns 4, table 5 and table 15,
appendix 6.2—).
The second piece of evidence is given by the result of testing hypothesis 2b. It has
been argued that if both v_sec and v_auton are explained by similar factors, the
coefficients of a model studying these two phenomena together using a joint sample,
would be biased. Hypothesis 2b helps us in answering this question as it gives
as a quantifiable measure of how different are the coefficients between the models
explaining v_sec and v_auton. A Wald test does not reject the null hypothesis
of the coefficients being equal for any of the variables —not even at the 10% level.
This holds both for the models using the separated and full samples (rows 1 and 2,
table 4). Hence, hypothesis 2b is also satisfied, as there are no statistically different
results between the coefficients in the models explaining the support for autonomist
and secessionist parties.
In short, all available evidence supports aggregating the two sub-types of regionalist
voting together. However, given that they have been frequently studied separately
in the existing literature, it seems relevant to assess whether the main results for
the determinants of v_reg, and specifically the interaction between cultural and
economic factors, hold for each form of regionalism.
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4.3.1 Hypothesis 3
Since this paper points towards an important bias in the results for v_sec and
v_auton using the full sample, we will test whether the interactions between cultural
and economic variables are significant with separated samples. In order to shed light
on the determinants of v_sec, we drop the observations with a positive value for
v_auton (N= 759), and conversely we drop the positive observations for v_auton
when studying v_sec (N= 822) (5).
Although distance_GDP loses its significance,26 the interaction language_GDP
keeps it, thus confirming hypothesis 3. Also, the effect of GDP_ratio vanishes
as we bring in the interactions. These findings are robust to using Tobit instead
of OLS, including frequency weights, using only the last cross-section of the data,
running a 2SLS model (instrumenting distance and its interaction with language
and its interaction), and including only one of the cultural variables and its inter-
action. Some minor exceptions aside,27 hypothesis 3 is satisfied and the interaction
effect between cultural and economic variables is positive and significant in models
explaining secessionism and autonomism.
Despite potential concerns regarding research design (i.e. the samples have been
artificially separated), as the results for secessionist and autonomist support are
consistent and comparable to those for v_reg, the interdependency of cultural and
economic explanatory factors is reinforced.
4.3.2 Exploring other variables and related robustness checks
This section briefly explores the additional controls used, on top of those reported
in the tables. Some of these controls are excluded because they were not significant
in the main regression, or not robust to different specifications, and do not modify
any result significantly.28 The other reason to exclude some of the controls was their
endogeneity problem, namely regional_auton and ENERP . These two variables
have played a preeminent role in the literature so far (e.g. Sorens, 2005; Massetti,
2009), but suffer from an important problem of simultaneity, as they are directly
affected by the dependent variable. To tackle this problem, we have instrumented
them with more exogenous variables.
ENERP is instrumented through chamber_size, a crucial aspect in the magnitude
of district (Taagepera and Shugart, 1989), and a 2SLS regression is run. We find
a 2SLS positive and significant coefficient for ENERP —F -statistic test for weak
instruments= 9.10 (p= 0.0031)—, implying that a higher degree of multipartism is
26The p-value for distance_GDP is 0.105 though —Column 4, table 5.
27There are two exceptions. With v_sec as the dependent variable, if only distance and its
interaction are included as cultural variables, neither GDP_ratio nor the GDP_distance inter-
action are significant, and if we use only the last cross section, the interactions are not significant
(N= 75).
28These include distance_sq, EU , religion, indep, and capital, as well as the legal status of the
language (whether or not if it is official), whether or not the region is in the mainland, population
density, the population of the country, the proportional population of the region over that of the
country, and the ideological gap.
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
v_sec v_sec v_auton v_auton
GDP_ratio 5.584∗ -0.720 9.046∗∗ -6.875∗
(3.023) (5.099) (4.267) (3.601)
distance 0.619 0.638 0.438∗∗∗ 1.025∗∗∗
(0.471) (0.481) (0.162) (0.294)
language 5.266∗ 12.89∗∗ 5.905 16.01∗∗∗
(3.024) (5.018) (4.133) (4.469)
distance_GDP 0.135 1.128
(1.434) (0.690)
language_GDP 40.33∗∗∗ 63.66∗∗∗
(13.83) (13.76)
year 0.102∗∗∗ 0.103∗∗∗ 0.0957∗∗∗ 0.111∗∗∗
(0.0287) (0.0277) (0.0316) (0.0320)
has_neighbor 0.664 -1.060 1.102 -2.003
(1.338) (1.396) (1.368) (1.235)
richer_neighbor 5.842∗∗ 5.653∗∗ 5.791∗∗ 5.104∗∗∗
(2.685) (2.663) (2.430) (1.839)
population -0.115∗∗ -0.118∗∗ -0.157∗∗ -0.130∗∗∗
(0.0497) (0.0468) (0.0610) (0.0433)
chamber_size 0.0804∗∗ 0.0906∗∗ 0.0778∗ 0.0900∗∗∗
(0.0404) (0.0378) (0.0395) (0.0343)
regional_elect 1.279 1.254 1.226∗∗∗ 1.084∗∗∗
(0.793) (0.777) (0.384) (0.366)
Country FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 759 759 822 822
R2 0.492 0.519 0.459 0.619
Adjusted R2 0.480 0.506 0.447 0.609
Table 5 – Vote for secessionist and autonomist parties. Pooled ordinary least squares
(OLS) model explaining votes for secessionist (columns 1 and 2) and autonomist par-
ties (columns 3 and 4). The regression for each type of regionalist vote excludes those
regions with a positive amount of the other type of regionalist vote (separate samples).
Errors are clustered at the regional level. The constant term is excluded for paucity.
Standard errors are given in parentheses. *p<0.10, **<0.05, ***p<0.01.
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associated with a better electoral performance of regionalist parties (Column 1, table
14, appendix 6.2). Similarly, we instrument regional_auton with hist_together.
While the F -statistic of excluded instruments for the first stage is a bit low (2.65,
p= 0.106), the 2SLS coefficient for region_auton is 29.17, and significant at the
1% (see column 2, table 14, appendix 6.2). This points towards higher regional
autonomy having a positive effect on regionalist support.
There are two additional caveats to our results: (1) the main model does not take
into account irredentist particularities, and (2) some parties are present in several
regions at the same time, which might make these observations non-independent.
When we incorporate irredentist_potential into our model, it does not have an
impact on regionalist voting and does not change our findings (Column 4, 2). Ad-
ditionally, when we drop the 18 territorial units where this variable was positive,
our main results still hold (see column 3, table 14, appendix 6.2). To control for
potential problems derived from the same regionalist parties contesting elections in
different regions, we include the party_elsewhere variable. Again, when we include
this variable in the regression it is not significant and does not affect the results.
These are also robust to dropping the observations corresponding to the 17 regions
with relevant regional parties contending in some other region (e.g. Lega Nord,
PNV, etc.) (see column 4, table 14, appendix 6.2).
5 Conclusions
This paper analyzes the effect of cultural and economic factors on voters’ desire for
greater regional autonomy and independence using a panel of territorial subunits
in 10 West European democracies. We extended the traditional theory using the
concept of cultural proximity. The main argument is that the population of richer
regions is more likely to tolerate transfers to poorer regions as long as they feel part
of the same national group. In relatively rich and culturally differentiated regions,
there should be a larger political support for regionalism. This hypothesis is tested
empirically using a data set with the results from regional elections in these countries
between 1969 and 2000 —updated with the most recent elections till 2014. Evidence
in support of the predictions of the theoretical framework is found in the form of
statistically significant interaction effects between cultural and economic variables.
Moreover, regional relative aﬄuence only has a positive effect on the support for
regionalism through these interaction terms: a region being relatively richer is only
associated with an expected higher support for regionalist parties to the extent that
it is culturally differentiated (i.e., the proportion of minority language speakers and
physical distance are larger). Equivalently, the degree to which a region’s cultural
difference is associated with a higher support for regionalist parties depends on its
relative income, as this effect is much larger for rich than for poor regions. Also, both
theory and empirical evidence suggest that support for autonomist and secessionist
parties should be considered together in electoral studies: the interaction between
income and culture underpins both, and there are good reasons to think that models
using common samples to study these two phenomena separately will be biased.
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Further research is necessary to unravel plausible interaction effects between in-
come and cultural variables beyond Western Europe, and also to understand why
the interactions do not hold for some particular cases. Additional theoretical and
empirical studies that incorporate microdata should complement this study by an-
alyzing whether this interaction effect applies at an individual voter level – and, in
that case, exploring the concrete mechanism that might explain it. Also, locating all
(regionalist and nonregionalist parties) that compete in an election on a territorial
continuum that ranges from extreme secessionism to maximum unionism (e.g., on
the basis of party manifestos per each election) might help us to understand further
how this interaction operates.
To summarize, the main theses of the paper are supported by our empirical analy-
ses. Firstly, cultural and economic factors affect regionalist voting through a positive
and significant interaction —this even makes the relative aﬄuence of the region in-
significant on its own. Secondly, keeping aggregated autonomist and secessionist
electoral support in a unique regionalist category —instead of considering them as
two separated phenomena —seems more adequate. Finally, the significant inter-
action between income and culture in the separate explanation of autonomist and
secessionist support reinforces its relevance in any electoral study of minority na-
tionalism.
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6 Appendix
6.1 Description of main unreported controls
• Regional_auton: The level of autonomy already obtained by the region at
the time of the corresponding election, taking values 0 (less autonomous) to
4 most autonomous. If included as a control, the coefficient associated to this
variable is positive and highly significant. This variable, borrowed from Sorens
2005, suffers from a serious endogeneity problem produced by simultaneity, as
regions with a higher electoral support for regionalist parties tend to obtain
higher quotas of autonomy. We instrument this variable with hist_together.
• Hist_together is used as instrument for regional_auton. As regions relatively
recently annexed to their current country will tend to show a higher support
for regionalist parties, we create a dummy variable which takes the value 1 if
the region has always been part of the country since 1648, and 0 otherwise.
The year 1648, when the Treaty of Westphalia was signed, marks the “end
of the feudal system of family properties and the beginning of modern state
nationalism” (Sorens 2005: 309). Having been part of the union since then
might be associated with lower support for regionalism.
• Indep is a dummy variable similar toHist_together—but less restrictive—and
borrowed from Sorens 2005. It takes value 1 if the region has declared itself
an independent country or served as the capital province of an independent
country different from the current state at any point since 1648.
• ENERP : Effective Number of Electoral Regional Parties. As regionalist par-
ties are often small, highly disproportional systems that reduce party choices
are supposedly detrimental to them. The formula by Laakso and Taagepera
1979 (Sorens, 2005) is adapted:
ENERP = 1∑n
i=1 p
2
i
where n is the number of parties and p2i is the square of each party’s pro-
portion of all votes. Note that if a higher ENERP is the consequence of
larger support for regionalist parties, as one could expect, there is a problem
of endogeneity. Hence, we instrument ENERP trough chamber_size in some
robustness checks.
• Religion is a dummy coded as 1 if at least 10% of the regional population’s
creed differs from the majoritarian one in the country.
• Distance_sq is the squared distance, frequently included in gravity models.
As the effect of distance is expected to decrease as distance becomes larger,
this variable should have a negative coefficient.
• A dummy to control whether the capital of the country is in the region.
• A dummy to control whether the region is part of a EU member state.
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• In order to control for spatial autocorrelation, a dummy variable party_elsewhere
is created. It takes value 1 if there is a regionalist party in the region which is
also present and gains relevant support in another region, and 0 otherwise.
• Following Sorens 2005, we take into account the specific subtype of separatism,
irredentism, that might bias our findings. A dummy variable irredentist_potential
equals 1 if a region has a neighboring country which main language is the same
as the regional language, and 0 otherwise.
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6.2 Tables
Country Regions
France Alsace, Aquitaine, Auvergne, Brittany, Burgundy, Cen-
tre, Champagne-Ardenne, Corsica, Franche-Comte, Guade-
loupe, Guiana, Ile-de-France, La Reunion, Languedoc-
Roussillon, Limousin, Lorraine, Lower Normandy, Mar-
tinique, Midi-Pyrenees, Nord-Pas-de-Calais, Pays de la
Loire, Picardy, Poitou-Charentes, Provence-Alpes-Cote
d’Azur, Rhone-Alpes, Upper Normandy
Germany Baden-Wurttemberg, Bavaria, Berlin, Brandenburg, Bre-
men, Hamburg, Hesse, Mecklenburg-Vor, Lower Saxony,
North Rhine-Westphalia, Rhineland-Palatinate, Saarland,
Saxony, Saxony-Anhalt, Schleswig-Holstein, Thuringia
Italy Abruzzo, AostaValley, Apulia, Basilicata, Calabria, Campa-
nia, Emilia-Romagna, Friuli-VG, Lazio, Liguria, Lombardia,
Marche, Molise, Piedmont, Sardinia, Sicily, Tuscany, Um-
bria, Veneto, Trentino-South Tyrol
Portugal Azores, Madeira
Spain Andalusia, Aragon, Asturias, Balearic Islands, Basque
Country, Canary Islands, Cantabria, Castile La Mancha,
Castile and Leon, Catalonia, Extremadura, Galicia, La Ri-
oja, Madrid, Murcia, Navarre, Valencia, Ceuta,Melilla
U.K. Scotland, Wales, Northern Ireland, Gibraltar
Austria Burgenland, Carinthia, Lower Austria, Salzburg, Styria, Ty-
rol, Upper Austria, Vienna, Vorarlberg
Denmark Hovedstaden, Midtjylland, Nordjylland, Sjælland, Syddan-
mark, Faroe Islands
The
Nether-
lands
Groningen, Friesland, Drenthe, Overijssel, Gelderland,
Flevoland, Utrecht, Noord-Holland, Zuid-Holland, Zeeland,
Noord-Brabant, Limburg
Belgium Flanders, Wallonia, Brussels, German-speaking communi-
ties
Table 6 – List of Regions included in the analysis
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Country Region Secessionist
parties
V. sec (%) Autonomist parties V. aut
(%)
It Emilia-Romagna,
Friuli-VG, Liguria,
Lombardia, Marche,
Piedmont, Tuscany,
Umbria, Veneto
Lega Nord 13.7, 8.3,
10.2, 13,
6.3, 16.7,
6.5, 4.3,
35.5
It Sardinia PdS, iRS, Pro-
gReS
6.2 RM, PSd’Az, RS, UDS 17.5
It Sicily PdS, GS, PC 21.4
It Trentino LN 6.2 UPT, PATT, PT, CT,
AT
45.7
It South Tyrol STF, F, BU 27.2 SVP, VGV, TA, AAC 59
It Molise GS 5.1
UK Gibraltar GSD, LP, GSLP 100
UK Scotland SNP, SGP 48.4
UK Northern Ireland SF 30 SDLP 12.2
UK Wales PC 17.9
Be Flanders N-VA, VB 37.8
Be Brussels N-VA, VB 2.7 FDF 13.1
Be Germ-speak comm. ProDG 22.2
Au Tyrol STF, LN-Alto
Adige,
9.7 SVP, CU-Lad 47.8
Au Burgerland LBL 4
Neth Groningen Partij voor het Noor-
den
3.15
Neth Friesland FNP, P. voor het Noor-
den
9.5
Neth Utrecht PLP Utrecht, Mooi
Utrecht
0.55
Neth Noord-Holland ONH 1.88
Neth Zeeland Partij voor Zeeland 5.66
Denm Faroe Islands FF, T, F 47.1 SSF, MF 10.4
Po Azores PDA 0.49
Ger Bavaria BP 2.1 DF 0.74
Ger Schleswig-Holstein SSW 4.6
Sp Andalusia PA 2.5
Sp Aragon PAR, CHA 18
Sp Asturias FAC 25.2
Sp Balearic Islands EQUERRA 1.3 PSM, IB-LLIGA, CxI,
ENE, Ume
12.7
Sp Basque Country PNV, EHB/-
Bildu, A,
EA
59.6
Sp Canary Islands CC, Nca 35
Sp Cantabria PRC 29.8
Sp Castile and Leon UPL 1.9
Sp Catalonia CDC, ERC,
CUP
39.9 UDC, ICV 15.6
Sp Galicia BNG 10.2 ANOVA, CxG 15
Sp La Rioja PR 5.6
Sp Navarre PNV, EHB/-
Bildu, A,
NaBai
29.4 UPN, CDN 36.8
Sp Valencia COM 7.4
Sp Ceuta CAB 14.5
Sp Melilla CM, PPL 30.9
Fr Alsace Alsace d’Abord 25.9
Fr Aquitaine PNV, AB 0.7
Fr Brittany BP 4.3 Terres de Bretagne 2.6
Fr Corsica CL 9.4 PNC 18.4
Fr La Reunion NR 0.9 PCR 30.2
Fr Martinique PPM, RDM,
BPM
51 MIM 32.2
Fr Pays de la Loire BP 1
Fr Provence-Alpes-Cote
d’Azur
LS 2.7
Table 7 – Classification of regionalist political parties and votes—in the last regional
election considered till 2014—in percentage.
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v_reg v_sec v_aut GDP_rat. dist. lang. dist_GDP
v_reg 1
v_sec 0.768 1
v_auton 0.7757 0.1927 1
GDP_ratio 0.2445 0.1770 0.2005 1
distance 0.3197 0.1592 0.3334 -0.1155 1
language 0.4207 0.2909 0.3584 -0.0575 0.2182 1
dist_GDP -0.0300 0.0239 -0.0697 0.3670 -0.8078 -0.1418 1
lang_GDP 0.1497 0.0791 0.1516 0.6602 -0.2040 -0.4007 0.4082
Table 8 – Correlations between the main variables related to regionalist support,
income and cultural differences.
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
v_reg v_reg v_reg v_reg
GDP_ratio 10.05∗∗∗ 0.707 14.02∗∗∗ 2.332
(3.787) (5.023) (4.255) (4.582)
distance 0.898∗∗∗ 2.035∗∗∗
(0.260) (0.463)
distance_GDP 3.205∗∗∗
(0.955)
language 22.08∗∗∗ 28.78∗∗∗
(7.079) (7.411)
language_GDP 49.47∗∗∗
(16.03)
year 0.149∗∗∗ 0.158∗∗∗ 0.193∗∗∗ 0.196∗∗∗
(0.0437) (0.0416) (0.0442) (0.0434)
has_neighbor -2.838 -3.513 -2.808 -4.693
(3.220) (3.005) (3.152) (3.114)
richer_neighbor 14.06∗∗∗ 12.65∗∗∗ 12.49∗∗∗ 12.14∗∗∗
(3.875) (3.642) (3.405) (3.347)
population -0.217∗∗∗ -0.234∗∗∗ -0.141∗∗ -0.122∗∗
(0.0629) (0.0593) (0.0615) (0.0557)
chamber_size 0.133∗∗ 0.157∗∗∗ 0.0605 0.0649
(0.0535) (0.0505) (0.0526) (0.0471)
regional_elect 2.773∗∗∗ 2.691∗∗∗ 2.883∗∗∗ 2.689∗∗∗
(0.690) (0.691) (0.681) (0.698)
Country FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1102 1102 1102 1102
R2 0.481 0.534 0.484 0.511
Adjusted R2 0.473 0.526 0.476 0.502
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 9 – Vote for regionalist parties, using only one cultural variable and its interac-
tion with GDP_ratio. Pooled OLS model explaining votes for regionalist (autonomist
+ secessionist) parties using the full sample. The constant term is excluded from the
table for paucity. Errors clustered at the regional level. Standard errors in parenthe-
ses. ∗p < 0.10, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01.
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
v_reg v_reg v_reg v_reg
GDP_ratio 30.15∗∗∗ -3.179 22.41∗∗∗ -4.782
(10.43) (7.356) (5.776) (7.534)
distance 0.353∗∗ 1.094∗∗∗ 0.461∗∗ 1.117∗∗
(0.172) (0.372) (0.182) (0.499)
language 31.00∗∗∗ 38.68∗∗∗ 20.33∗∗∗ 25.31∗∗∗
(6.564) (7.562) (6.958) (8.568)
distance_GDP 1.439 1.210
(0.974) (1.127)
language_GDP 103.1∗∗∗ 76.68∗∗∗
(30.12) (28.84)
year -1.637 -0.916
(1.417) (1.389)
has_neighbor 0.469 -3.784
(2.900) (2.734)
richer_neighbor 12.89∗∗∗ 13.31∗∗∗
(4.073) (3.866)
population -0.166∗ -0.199∗∗
(0.0856) (0.0903)
chamber_size 0.0435 0.130
(0.0732) (0.0803)
Country FEs No No Yes Yes
Observations 120 120 120 120
R2 0.370 0.535 0.645 0.711
Adjusted R2 0.354 0.514 0.586 0.656
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 10 – Vote for regionalist parties. Cross sectional OLS model explaining votes
for regionalist (autonomist + secessionist) parties using the reduced sample, which
only includes observations compiled by the authors. The constant term is excluded
from the regression tables for paucity. Errors clustered at the regional level. Standard
errors in parentheses. ∗p < 0.10, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01.
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
v_reg v_reg v_reg v_reg
GDP_ratio 33.03∗∗∗ -16.91 13.47∗∗∗ -21.06∗∗
(8.567) (19.61) (4.179) (9.724)
distance 5.817∗∗∗ 9.812∗∗∗ 2.986∗∗∗ 5.559∗∗∗
(1.911) (3.302) (0.943) (1.402)
distance_GDP 16.53∗ 11.08∗∗∗
(8.576) (3.793)
year 0.0127 0.135∗∗
(0.0701) (0.0668)
has_neighbor -2.613 -5.095
(2.973) (3.216)
richer_neighbor 13.08∗∗∗ 8.817∗
(3.661) (5.140)
population -0.232∗∗∗ -0.279∗∗∗
(0.0632) (0.0779)
chamber_size 0.167∗∗∗ 0.228∗∗∗
(0.0541) (0.0703)
regional_elect 1.997∗∗∗ 2.220∗∗∗
(0.714) (0.733)
Country FEs No No Yes Yes
Observations 1232 1232 1102 1102
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 11 – Vote for regionalist parties. 2SLS model explaining votes for regionalist
(autonomist + secessionist) parties using the full sample. Distance is instrumented
with language and distance_GDP with language_GDP . The constant term is ex-
cluded from the table for paucity. Errors clustered at the regional level. Standard
errors in parentheses. ∗p < 0.10, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01.
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
v_reg v_reg v_reg v_reg
GDP_ratio 36.81∗∗∗ -0.895 21.75∗∗∗ -2.457
(11.11) (13.64) (5.393) (8.565)
distance 1.321∗∗∗ 3.244∗∗∗ 0.932∗∗∗ 2.141∗∗∗
(0.443) (0.676) (0.282) (0.471)
language 48.78∗∗∗ 52.95∗∗∗ 32.43∗∗∗ 32.94∗∗∗
(12.42) (10.46) (9.599) (8.459)
distance_GDP 5.431∗∗∗ 3.157∗∗∗
(1.533) (1.098)
language_GDP 76.71∗∗ 41.81∗
(30.04) (23.64)
year 0.332∗∗∗ 0.351∗∗∗
(0.0822) (0.0784)
has_neighbor -1.209 -3.391
(4.738) (4.101)
richer_neighbor 18.18∗∗∗ 16.83∗∗∗
(5.256) (5.044)
population -0.213∗∗ -0.223∗∗∗
(0.0898) (0.0820)
chamber_size 0.122∗ 0.149∗∗
(0.0707) (0.0627)
regional_election 6.811∗∗∗ 6.398∗∗∗
(1.249) (1.314)
Country FEs No No Yes Yes
Observations 1232 1232 1102 1102
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 12 – Vote for regionalist parties. Tobit model – left censored at 0 and right
censored at 100- explaining votes for regionalist (autonomist + secessionist) parties
using the full sample. The constant term is excluded from the table for paucity. Errors
clustered at the regional level. Standard errors in parentheses. ∗p < 0.10, ∗∗p < 0.05,
∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01.
31
(1) (2) (3) (4)
v_reg v_reg v_reg v_reg
GDP_ratio 16.43∗∗ -1.313 12.27∗∗∗ -2.280
(6.815) (2.770) (3.444) (5.208)
distance 0.805∗∗ 0.787∗∗ 0.718∗∗∗ 1.025∗∗∗
(0.310) (0.330) (0.217) (0.273)
language 19.77∗∗∗ 32.48∗∗∗ 9.998∗∗ 19.94∗∗∗
(7.268) (7.013) (4.490) (6.104)
distance_GDP 0.670 1.457∗
(0.893) (0.763)
language_GDP 95.18∗∗∗ 60.72∗∗∗
(22.47) (18.01)
year 0.173∗∗∗ 0.181∗∗∗
(0.0489) (0.0456)
has_neighbor -0.0945 -2.943
(1.907) (1.913)
richer_neighbor 9.870∗∗∗ 7.579∗∗∗
(3.193) (2.660)
population -0.118∗∗ -0.122∗∗∗
(0.0516) (0.0459)
chamber_size 0.0634 0.0916∗∗
(0.0470) (0.0419)
regional_elect 1.711∗∗ 1.683∗∗
(0.656) (0.647)
Country FEs No No Yes Yes
Observations 31732 31732 28859 28859
R2 0.262 0.458 0.573 0.635
Adjusted R2 0.262 0.458 0.573 0.634
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 13 – Vote for regionalist parties. Pooled OLS model with frequency weights
as given by -the regional- population, explaining votes for regionalist (autonomist +
secessionist) parties using the full sample. The constant term is excluded from the
table for paucity. Errors clustered at the regional level. Standard errors in parentheses.
∗p < 0.10, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01.
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
v_reg v_reg v_reg v_reg
regional_auton 29.17∗∗∗
(5.690)
ENERP 12.47∗∗
(5.562)
GDP_ratio -6.688 -0.520 -1.012 -6.505∗
(6.009) (5.048) (4.624) (3.642)
distance 1.527∗∗∗ 1.006∗∗∗ 1.139∗∗∗ 1.634∗∗∗
(0.434) (0.294) (0.292) (0.263)
language 17.26∗∗ 11.43∗∗ 15.55∗∗ 23.69∗∗∗
(7.522) (4.690) (6.181) (6.836)
distance_GDP 1.875∗∗ 0.969 1.471∗∗ 2.321∗∗∗
(0.936) (0.662) (0.717) (0.601)
language_GDP 30.95 43.61∗∗∗ 27.88 59.34∗∗∗
(24.61) (14.96) (20.51) (13.97)
year 0.683∗∗∗ -0.249∗∗ 0.0857∗ 0.118∗∗∗
(0.248) (0.105) (0.0463) (0.0389)
has_neighbor -2.440 -2.175 -2.396 -4.995
(3.013) (1.561) (1.706) (3.256)
richer_neighbor 11.20∗∗∗ 9.898∗∗∗ 10.55∗∗∗ 8.317∗∗∗
(3.047) (2.705) (3.379) (3.020)
population -0.0307 -0.197∗∗∗ -0.127∗∗ -0.109∗∗∗
(0.0256) (0.0522) (0.0492) (0.0413)
regional_elect 6.572∗∗∗ -0.996 2.244∗∗∗ 1.846∗∗∗
(1.794) (0.952) (0.744) (0.497)
chamber_size 0.121∗∗∗ 0.0828∗ 0.0871∗∗
(0.0419) (0.0452) (0.0375)
Country FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 934 1096 956 939
R2 - - 0.612 0.636
Adjusted R2 - - 0.604 0.628
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 14 – Various robustness checks. 2SLS regression instrumenting ENERP
with chamber_size (1). 2SLS instrumenting regional_auton with hist_together
(2). Pooled OLS excluding those regions with irredentist potential from the sample
(3). Pooled OLS excluding those regions with a regional party which is also in another
region from the sample (4). Errors are clustered at the regional level. The constant
term is excluded from the table for paucity. Standard errors in parentheses. ∗p < 0.10,
∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01.
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
v_sec v_sec v_auton v_auton
GDP_ratio 4.780∗ 0.0519 8.967∗∗ -4.191
(2.534) (4.454) (4.097) (4.101)
distance 0.134 0.324 0.550∗∗∗ 1.231∗∗∗
(0.0947) (0.275) (0.144) (0.231)
language 9.314∗∗ 10.57∗∗ 7.844∗ 10.03∗
(3.897) (5.289) (4.265) (5.561)
distance_GDP 0.481 1.760∗∗∗
(0.600) (0.649)
language_GDP 13.59 31.05
(17.27) (21.37)
year 0.0958∗∗∗ 0.0976∗∗∗ 0.0583∗ 0.0611∗∗
(0.0303) (0.0305) (0.0307) (0.0287)
has_neighbor -3.143∗ -3.765∗∗ 0.405 -1.049
(1.674) (1.742) (1.920) (1.641)
richer_neighbor 9.108∗∗∗ 8.834∗∗∗ 3.721 2.845
(3.239) (3.292) (2.377) (2.268)
population -0.0396 -0.0389 -0.123∗ -0.127∗∗
(0.0466) (0.0450) (0.0656) (0.0559)
chamber_size 0.0518 0.0586 0.0303 0.0491
(0.0413) (0.0394) (0.0399) (0.0355)
regional_elect 0.952∗∗ 0.886∗∗ 1.791∗∗∗ 1.611∗∗∗
(0.443) (0.438) (0.533) (0.534)
Country FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1098 1098 1072 1072
R2 0.342 0.352 0.378 0.453
Adjusted R2 0.331 0.340 0.368 0.442
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 15 – Vote for secessionist and autonomist parties. Standard errors in parenthe-
ses. Pooled OLS model explaining votes for secessionist parties, using the full sample,
columns (1), (2), and for autonomist parties, columns (3), (4). Errors are clustered at
the regional level. The constant term is excluded from the table for paucity. Standard
errors in parentheses. ∗p < 0.10, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01.
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6.3 Figure
Figure 2 – Net wealth distribution in surveyed EMU countries (ECB,2013)
Figure 3 – Hypothetical support for different parties as a function of a variable
X. The crossed arrow illustrates what we would be comparing —and should not
compare—if we use the vote for autonomist parties as dependent variable.
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